

Constitutional Collapse: The Faulty Founding

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Beneath the present economic-financial crisis is a deeper one that is the source of at least some of the disaster—a constitutional failure. I will get to this financial-economic crisis towards the end of my discussion because I must first consider our constitutional order. However, since I don't want all of you to race to the exits in order to immediately cash in your constitutional bonds—although by their nature these bonds are invisible—I will say now that we haven't arrived at constitutional collapse. But, what I will call our working constitution is in sad need of repair, and some of the fault lines have become startlingly apparent in these last months.¹

The Constitutional Theory of James Madison

Let's begin, then, appropriately enough, at the beginning, with the foundations of this republic, that is, with political fundamentals—and specifically with the thought of its principal architect, James Madison. His thinking—as it shaped the founding of the republic, and the institutions that were created then—has shaped us as a people. These institutions have and continue to constitute us as a people, shaping our character in a multitude of ways.

To be sure, this Madisonian tale that I am going to tell is a strange one because one short man with a squeaky voice—that is, Madison—was able to think deeply and powerfully about popular self-government, and do it in the middle of nowhere—which is to say, in the America of 1787. His effort was not without its flaws and that will be part of my subject, but it was an amazing feat that commands and should command the deepest respect from us, his beneficiaries.

You will notice that I have used the word "constitute" as a verb—as in "to constitute a people." It is Madison as a constitutional thinker that is my concern: his thoughts on how to create and maintain the political institutions and political practices that have helped us to become a self-governing people. Madison's understanding of these matters is a lens through which we can look at our present political order to see how it is in fact working and how it is supposed to work. He gives us the pieces of the puzzle of self-government on which we must focus if we are to understand our successes and failures.

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The Politics of 'Misrecognition': A Feminist Critique

Claudia Leeb

Introduction

For the past decade and a half, social and political thinkers have appropriated the Hegelian trope of a "struggle for recognition" to generate theories that lead to a democratic politics of inclusion.¹ The different strands within the "politics of recognition debate" share the conviction that "recognition" is a central human good and the precondition for justice in pluralist societies. However, the French psychoanalytic philosopher Jacques Lacan questions an ethics based on recognition. "Lots of things have been made to fit within the political myth of the 'struggle for life,'" he argues in *Book I*, "If it was Darwin who wrought it, that was because he came of a nation of privateers, for whom racism was the basic industry."²

I share Lacan's suspicion of an ethics based on recognition or its counterpart—misrecognition. Contemporary thinkers, who have wrought this trope for politics have continued to mythologize it, thereby not so much contributing to a politics of inclusion, but instead, perpetuating a politics of exclusions. What parades as a pluralist society where subjects supposedly "equally recognize each other in their diversity" often ends up in the exclusion of *different* subjects, such as women, sexual and racial minorities, and the poor. Although the influence of the politics of recognition is fading, perhaps because some thinkers have realized its inherent problems, it remains a dominant strand in contemporary political theorizing.

Some thinkers, such as Patchen Markell, have pointed to the problematic aspects of a politics based on recognition. The dominance of the "politics of recognition" in contemporary political theorizing, Markell argues, does not so much contribute to establish more just societies; instead, this strand of theorizing "made it more difficult to comprehend and confront unjust social and political relations."³ Although there are some contemporary thinkers who question the validity of the politics of recognition debate, a thorough critique on this strand of thinking remains to be written—its representatives remain perhaps too powerful figures in the field of political theory and philosophy to be challenged.

This paper develops such a challenge further. Its aim is twofold: First, it explains why the language of recognition delivers an inadequate foundation for a political theory that aims at a

politics of inclusion. Second, it proposes an alternative political theory, a "politics of a subject-in-outline," as a philosophical foundation for a politics of inclusion.⁴ It shows that a politics of recognition functions on the level of the Lacanian ego, which excludes everyone who does not neatly fit into the ideal whole it defends. In contrast, a politics of a subject-in-outline emerges in the Lacanian real, the moment *beyond* recognition, which points at the gaps in the political community. It is through these gaps where those excluded can enter the political community and contest its boundaries.

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The paper defends its argument in three sections. The first section, "The Ego in the Hegelian Mirror Encounter," explains why a politics of recognition leads to injustice. It reads Lacan alongside Hegel, to show why Hegel himself, who is claimed by contemporary recognition theorists (from Fukuyama to Honneth) as the central source for their vision of a just society based on mutual recognition,

was rather suspicious of an ethics based on recognition. This section argues that Hegel's staging of the processes of "mutual recognition" in the *Phenomenologie des Geistes* leads to the creation of a politics of the ego, which violently suppresses difference.

The second section, "A Politics of a Subject-in-Outline," shows that the aspect in Lacan's thought where Lacan goes beyond Hegel—the real—provides a philosophical basis for a politics of inclusion. Hegel, although suspicious of an ethics based on recognition, ultimately aimed to establish a just society based on recognition, which renders his project problematic for political theorizing. In contrast, Lacan's thought is fruitful for such theorizing, *because* it breaks with the limited language of recognition. Such a break occurs at the point when the real takes center stage in his later works.⁵ Here the language of recognition and misrecognition disappears and the possibility of an ethics grafted on the real reappears in Lacan's thought.

The third section, "A Feminist Subject-In-Outline," applies the arguments developed in the previous sections to contemporary feminist political theorizing. It shows that Judith Butler, although critical of a politics based on recognition, remains caught in the language of recognition. That leads to tensions in her formulation of a feminist politics of inclusion.⁶ It shows that

only a clear break with the politics and language of recognition can lead to a feminist politics that does not suppress difference. Such a feminist politics needs to base itself on a feminist subject-in-outline, as it is only such a subject that has the capacity to remain open for difference and continuing self-critique.

The Ego in the Hegelian Mirror Encounter

A reading of Lacan alongside Hegel underlines that the Hegelian account of “mutual recognition” does *not* provide philosophical basis for a social and political theory that aims to contribute to a more just society. Instead of a society where subjects supposedly “equally recognize each other in their diversity,” we are confronted with a society where subjects (or more precisely egos) *supersede* each other, where they reduce the other to themselves. Lacan’s formulation of the ego is based upon Hegel’s elaboration of “mutual recognition” in “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage,” a chapter in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the main reference text for contemporary recognition theorists.

Here Hegel stages the subject’s (or self-consciousness) search for self-certainty as a *mirror encounter* of one subject with another one.⁷ The mirror encounter implies for Hegel two moments: “first, it [the subject] has lost itself, for it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self.”⁸ The ego emerges in Lacan’s *mirror stage*, which pertains to the imaginary domain. In the mirror stage, the individual, aims to establish her unity through identifying with an idealized whole image of an other with a small *o* (*autre*, symbolized as *a'*)—the image of another subject or the individual’s own mirror image.⁹

The outcome of this identification is the ego and *not* the subject. Although Hegel does not make the distinction between the subject and the ego, Lacan’s account of the ego refers to the two moments of recognition as outlined by Hegel.¹⁰ First, the subject “finds itself as an other being”¹¹ in the imaginary domain, because it *is* the other. Lacan explains this as the moment in the mirror stage, where the individual, for the first time, conceives “of [her/]himself as other than [s/]he is.”¹² Lacan expresses the notion of the Hegelian *recognition* then with *identification*. Second, Hegel’s argument that in the mirror encounter the subject “does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self”¹³ is central to Lacan’s account of the ego.

The ego supersedes the other, because it reduces the other to the ideal whole image. In the imaginary domain then, as Lacan puts it similar to Hegel, “the ego is the other, and the *other is me (moi)*.”¹⁴ Since the outcome of the mirror encounter—the ego—is the other, any difference of the other threatens the ego’s existence and needs to be eradicated. This eradication is the result

of a subject who remains *uncertain* of itself through recognition (Hegel) or imaginary identification (Lacan).¹⁵ “Desire [for recognition] has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed feeling of self,” argues Hegel, “But that is the reason why this satisfaction is itself a *fleeting* one, for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence.”¹⁶

Since the subject can grasp itself only through reflection in and the negation of the other, it remains fundamentally uncertain of itself. The result of the Hegelian mirror encounter, a subject that lacks any permanence, is central in Lacan’s characterization of the ego. Since the unity of the ego is the result of the identification with a foreign image of an other, it is merely an “ideal unity,” argues Lacan, “which is never attained as such and escapes [her/] him at every moment.”¹⁷ This fundamental uncertainty of the subject as a result of the mirror encounter leads into the “life and death struggle” outlined by Hegel. The subject aims to find self-certainty by denying its fundamental dependence on the other (its *being* the other).

As the other makes the same claims for independence, the subject aims to reaffirm its sovereignty in a struggle, which ends in the destruction of either the subject or the other. The “struggle for recognition,” as Lacan puts it in *Book I*, has then “no other outcome—Hegel teaches us that—than the destruction of the other.”¹⁸ Lacan elaborates this struggle with the “*it’s either the other or me*,” characteristic of the relations between the ego and its others.

On the imaginary plane it is either the other or me, because any moment of difference of the other from the ideal image that *is* the ego, threatens the ego’s existence. Since, as Lacan puts it, “the human subject is so constituted that the other is always on the point of re-adopting the place of mastery in relation to [her/] him,”¹⁹ an aggressive tension is at the heart of imaginary relations. This aggressive tension underlines that a politics of the ego or “mutual recognition” does not lead to justice. Rather, it leads to fundamental injustice, since it eradicates (or excludes) all those different others that do not fit neatly into the projects it defends.

It is then not so much an unequal distribution of recognition that leads to injustice, but the ego’s claim to mastery and sovereignty, *implied* in the pursuit of recognition, which leads to the suppression of difference. A politics of the ego does *not* lead to “equal recognition.” Rather, as Lacan argues, it leads to a political community where the subject “refinds [her/]himself only as misrecognition and negation.”²⁰ A politics of recognition (or the ego) is incapable of contributing to a just society, because it implies, as Hegel puts it, “the absolute melting-away of everything stable.”²¹ A subject (or political community) fundamentally uncertain of itself, cannot give up its quest for mastery and sovereignty, because such instability leads to fundamental *anxieties*.

Such anxieties lead to the ego's frantic quest to shore up its fragile unity through successive identifications with (or the seeking of recognition from) the other, which, as Lacan puts it, "either alienates [wo]man from [her]himself, or else ends in a destruction, a negation of the object."²² Instead of a just society, processes of "mutual recognition" lead then to precisely what recognition theorists claim to be aiming against – a society where subjects are alienated and difference is negated. The politics of recognition's anxious, repeated attempt to obtain recognition (or self-certainty) from the other leads to the establishment of its rigid boundaries. Such a politics excludes all those who do not neatly fit into the ideal whole it defends.

As this reading of Hegel with Lacan shows, contrary to the claim of contemporary recognition theorists, the Hegelian staging of the process of "mutual recognition" does not lead to a just society. Rather, its fundamental instability leads to anxieties that contribute to an aggressive tension, an "it's either you or me," which generates exclusions. Moreover, such a politics, as Lacan shows us, confuses aggression, inherent in the scenario of "the struggle for recognition" with the virtue of strength.²³ The good news that Lacan (and Hegel) brings us is that it never gets to the point of radical destruction, as there is always something else that intervenes between the ego and the other: the big Other.

A Politics of a Subject-in-Outline

In his early works Lacan conceptualizes the Other (*Autre*, symbolized as A), the symbolic domain, in a way that is still compatible with Hegel's later account of recognition, in which Hegel aimed (but failed) to realize a political community based on "mutual recognition" that does not suppress difference.²⁴ Lacan's holding on to the language of recognition in his early work is problematic, because a politics of recognition leads to injustices in pluralist societies. In *Book I* Lacan argues that desire for recognition, once it is named, "enters into the symbolic relation of I and you, in a relation of *mutual recognition*...into the order of the law," which allows subjects to deal with the aggressive tension characteristic of the imaginary.²⁵

In Lacan's early works recognition is then realized through the mediation of the signifier or language. Although Lacan contributes here to mythologize the notion of recognition, he redeemed himself in his later works, more precisely with *Book VII*, his book on ethics. In this book, Lacan shifted from elaborating the imaginary and the symbolic to explaining the real.²⁶ It is no coincidence that it is precisely here where the notion of "recognition" and "misrecognition" almost entirely disappears

from Lacan's texts. It is also no coincidence that Lacan returns in this book to the possibility of an ethics *not* based on "mutual recognition," but instead an ethics "grafted on to the real."²⁷

The real is an element in the symbolic order that resists absolute symbolization. It is a hole or a fracture in the Other and its signifiers.²⁸ The real does *not* refer to any reality, but it exposes that it is impossible to fully reach such a reality. In the moment of the real, as Lacan puts it in *Book X*, the Other "does not recognize me, as Hegel believed...nor does it misrecognize me...It *calls me into question*."²⁹ Whereas the ego is the result of the identification with (or recognition of) the other, the subject-in-outline emerges in the moment *beyond* recognition, in the holes of the Other. Such a subject realizes that the Other is non-whole itself and thus cannot guarantee any wholeness or recognition.

Only a clear break with the politics and language of recognition can lead to a feminist politics that does not suppress difference.

Hegel does not make a distinction between the other and the Other. However, the symbolic enters into the "struggle for recognition" in his account of work. According to Hegel, work allows "an element of permanence" in the subject, which is impossible in the mirror encounter of the subject with

the other.³⁰ For Hegel, work "is desire [for recognition] held in check, *fleetingness staved off*; in other words work forms and shapes the thing."³¹ In the Lacanian framework, the thing, which is formed through work activity, is the signifier. Lacan, similar to Hegel, argues that the subject that emerges in the gaps of the signifier has a *certain* stability, which is constantly threatened in the imaginary.

However, Lacan disagrees with Hegel: we cannot completely stave off all fleetingness, because the result of the work activity—the thing—is non-whole itself, because of the presence of the real. In *Book VII* Lacan refers to the Heideggerian vase to explain the hole in the signifier. Here the potter engages in work activity—s/he fashions a vase (the thing, the signifier) around an empty space. For Lacan, the vase is an object made to "represent the existence of the *emptiness* at the center of the real that is called the Thing."³² It is this emptiness of the thing—the gap in the signifier, which renders Hegel's promise of reciprocity, where subjects "*recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another*"³³ through the thing as impossible.

The real evinces that I can never be sure if the other makes the right interpretation (or recognition) of my address to her. Nor can I be sure of my interpretation of the other's address to me. The moment of the hole in the signifier and the symbolic domain, the domain of language, means that there remains a fundamental ambiguity in any dialogue. The desire to eliminate such ambiguities is not so much, as recognition theorists claim, a fundamental desire for recognition, but a desire to eliminate

the hole in the whole, *das Ding*, which remains at the heart of the subject.³⁴ The signifier provides a *certain* stability, which is crucial to deal with the aggressive tension inherent in a “politics of recognition.”

However, the signifier can *never* provide a complete stability, as implied in the quest for “mutual recognition,” which aims at eradicating any uncertainties. A politics of a subject-in-outline implies a subject, which *remains* an outline and with that it deals with the uncertainties the moment of the real incites. Although the confrontation with the real leads to fundamental anxieties, because it tells us that we can never reach wholeness, a subject-in-outline is in a good position to deal with them, because it has a certain stability, which the ego lacks. If a politics of a subject-in-outline fails to deal with such anxieties then it turns into a politics of the ego. Such a politics is caught up in the fantasy to reach full recognition or wholeness.

The politics of recognition is caught up in such a fantasy with its ever more refined theories of recognition, often formalized in detailed charts that carry with them the rigidity characteristic of the ego. Such charts express the anxiety of wanting to stave off any fleetingness remaining in their theories of justice. Such theories are hardly in a position to contribute to more just societies. Rather, their rigid boundaries are in danger of excluding all those “non-subjects” who do not neatly fit into the ideals of justice they defend. Whereas a politics of recognition aims to hold on to the illusion of achieving full recognition, a politics of a subject-in outline acknowledges that this drive leads to a politics of exclusions.

A politics of a subject-in-outline challenges Hegel’s solution of a reinstatement of the stable subject that, after a long process of “decentering,” finds its unity in *Geist* or the Other. In contrast to Hegel, Lacan’s real posits a fracture in the Other, which introduces a fundamental uncertainty into the subject, which we cannot and *should not* resolve. Whenever we aim to resolve this uncertainty then we are in the domain of a politics of recognition, which functions on the level of the ego that, in its quest to receive recognition from the Other, excludes everything different to itself. A politics of a subject-in-outline that grafts its ethics on the real offers then a more promising alternative for a feminist and democratic politics of inclusion.

A Feminist Subject-in-Outline

Like Lacan, the American feminist philosopher Judith Butler is critical of an ethics based on recognition. “The term [or signifier] cannot offer ultimate recognition,” she argues in *Bodies that Matter*, “it may be that the affirmation of that slippage, that failure of identification, is itself the point of departure for a more democratizing affirmation of internal difference.”³⁵ Her notion of a “failure of identification” seems to refer to the hole in the

symbolic domain—the Lacanian real. However, Butler rejects the notion of the real. Butler does not (like Lacan) locate the possibility of a “democratizing affirmation of internal difference” in the signifier’s holes (the real). Instead, for her such a possibility lies in the act of *repeating* (or reiterating) the signifier.

Lacan situates the moment of subversion in the gap of the signifier. In contrast, Butler assumes a certain unity of the signifier that we can subvert through our repeated efforts of gaining recognition from an alienating Other. “Repetition or better, iterability,” argues Butler, “becomes the non-place of subversion.”³⁶ Reiteration refers to repeated identifications with the dominant signifier, which implies for her the possibility that it may be articulated differently over time. Butler’s remaining caught in the language of recognition leads to tensions in her theory of the subject. For her, subjectivation—the becoming of the subject—is a “vicious circle,” because it is *always* bound up with subordination.³⁷

For Butler subjectivation necessarily leads to subordination, because her subject is the result of recognizing an alienating Other. However, as Lacan shows us, repeated identifications with (or recognitions of) the signifier do not lead to a subject that subverts the status quo. Rather, a politics of recognition leads to an alienated *and* alienating ego that upholds dominant signifiers. It is in the moment where the signifier does *not* recognize or misrecognize me, but where it calls me into question, where the subject-in-outline emerges. It is in the moment of the real, which is the moment *beyond* recognition, where the creation of new signifiers and identities that can subvert dominant ones becomes a radical possibility.

The subversion of the dominant signifier “woman,” which mainly included (and continues to mainly include) white, heterosexual and affluent women from the West, was not a result of, as Butler would argue, excluded women’s repeated recognition of this alienating Other. Such repeated recognitions would have merely led to a politics of the ego and with that reinforced the exclusions this dominant signifier engendered. Rather, it was in the moment of the real, the moment *beyond* recognition, where the signifier “woman” *failed* to determine what women are all about, where political agency became a possibility and those excluded could step forward and rearticulate the signifier “woman” *differently*.

A politics of a subject-in-outline argues that it is *not* so much the practice of (anxious) repeated recognitions that opens up the space for rearticulating dominant signifiers and identities. Rather, it is the gaps in the signifier itself that allow the subject-in-outline to step forward and contest the symbolic order. Butler’s holding on to a language of recognition in her theory of the subject leads to tensions in her feminist politics. Since for her the feminist subject is always bound up with subordination she argues that we can only counter a feminist politics of exclusions

through a pragmatic feminist politics that “will affirm identities that are alternately instituted and relinquished according to the purpose at hand.”³⁸

I disagree with Butler. Her pragmatic feminist politics is implicated in the politics of the ego. Such a politics does not have the certain certainty of the subject that would allow it to counter a feminist politics of exclusions. If we situate our feminist politics in a scenario, where the feminist subject is instituted or relinquished for specific purposes, then it is doomed to generate exclusions. A politics of the ego leads to anxieties that feed the quest for recognition. Such a quest might be endemic given the fundamental instability of the postmodern scenario of “constantly shifting identities.” However, a politics of the ego is in danger to exclude all those who do not live up to the feminist ideal it defends.

In order to address the injustices different women face on a daily basis we need to distinguish between the ego and the subject and proceed via a feminist subject. However, this subject needs to remain an outline. This implies that we need to say something about women; however, we need to be aware that *we cannot say everything*. Only a feminist politics, which emerges in the holes, points of fracture that appear in the unification has the necessary stability to engender an inclusive politics that remains open for progressive rectifications of the projects it proposes. Such a politics deals with the anxieties that its permanent openness of its identity and its projects (their remaining an outline) incites.

Thinkers, such as Simon Critchley, who argue that “the community remains an open community in so far as it is based on recognition of difference, of the difference of the Other,” are misguided.³⁹ He fails to grasp that it is the seeking of recognition from the Other, that brings total closure in a political community. Such a closed community leads to the violent exclusion of all those that do not neatly fit into its fantasmatic constructs of unity. A feminist subject-in-outline is not caught up in the quest for recognition. It accepts that full recognition is impossible and acknowledges its holes as there to stay. With that it remains open for all those others, who aim to enter (or exit) the feminist community and redefine its projects.

A feminist subject-in-outline implies a feminist politics, which encircles the feminist subject—women—from different angles of contextual perspectives, without ever fully grasping its meaning. Such a feminist politics *outlines* a vision for a just society. However, it is aware that it can never fully capture justice for *all* women. Acknowledging the moment of uncertainty in the feminist subject and its attempts to create a more just society, does not mean that we can and should give up on the feminist subject and its project of justice. Rather, a politics of a

subject-in-outline means that the feminist subject and its politics remains permanently open for progressive rectification.

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Endnotes

1. I would like to thank Denise Walsh for her comments on the paper.
2. Jacques Lacan, *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953–1954*, Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.) and John Forrester (trans.), (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975, 1991), 177; see also Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*, Bruce Fink (trans.) (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 297.
3. Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), 5.
4. For the beginnings of formulating a “subject-in-outline” see Claudia Leeb, “Toward a Theoretical Outline of the Subject: The Centrality of Adorno and Lacan for Feminist Political Theorizing,” *Political Theory* (Vol. 36, No. 3, June 2008), 351–76.
5. The real becomes central with *Book VII*; Jacques Lacan, *Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–1960*, Dennis Porter (trans.), (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986, 1992).
6. For a more thorough discussion of Judith Butler and Lacan see Claudia Leeb “The Im/Possibility of a Feminist Subject,” article forthcoming in *Social Philosophy Today* (Vol. 25, July 2009).
7. Instead of the Hegelian notion of (self-)consciousness, I will use the notion of subject.
8. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, A. V. Miller (trans.) (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph 179, 111.
9. That is, at the age of six and eighteen months, before the beginning of articulate speech. The mirror stage is not merely a stage in the development of the subject, but remains constitutive throughout a subject's life. See Jacques Lacan, *Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953–1954*, Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.) and John Forrester (trans.) (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975, 1991), 52.
10. It is no surprise that Lacan elaborated his account of the ego and the imaginary in the early 1930s, which is the same time when Hegel made his first impact on French thought through the lectures of Kojve on the *Phenomenologie*, which Lacan, together with other future important thinkers, such as Georges Bataille and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, attended. It is precisely this line of thinking, which problematizes “recognition” as the basis of justice that contemporary recognition theorists, such as Nancy Fraser, reject.
11. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 179, 111.

12. Lacan, *Book I*, 79.
13. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 179, 111, my emphasis.
14. Jacques Lacan, *Book III: The Psychoses, 1955–1956*, Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.) (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981, 1993), 34.
15. This leads to the stasis of the mirror encounter, in which neither subject dares to differ from its other. Hegel explains this stasis with the following statement: “Each sees the *other* do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same.” Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 182, 111.
16. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 190, 195, my emphasis.
17. Jacques Lacan, *Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–1955*, Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.) and Sylvana Tomaselli (trans.), (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978, 1991), 166.
18. Lacan, *Book I*, 170.
19. Lacan, *Book III*, 93.
20. Lacan, *Book III*, 240. In his early work Lacan still used the term “misrecognition,” which disappears in his later works.
21. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 194, 117.
22. Lacan, *Book II*, 166.
23. Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*, Bruce Fink (trans.) (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 297.
24. Patchen Markell argues that Hegel’s holding on to such an account of recognition leads to his exclusion of women from the political life. Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 96.
25. Lacan, *Book I*, 177; my emphasis; see also Lacan, *Book II*, 52.
26. However, all of these three dimensions, the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real are present throughout his works.
27. Lacan, *Book VII*, 21.
28. Jacques Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Book XX: Encore! 1972–1973*, Bruce Fink (trans.) and Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.) (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 28.
29. Lacan, *Book X*, 179–80.
30. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 195, 118.
31. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 195, 118, my emphasis.
32. Lacan, *Book VII*, 121, my emphasis.
33. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Paragraph 184, 112.
34. Lacan, *Book II*, 227.
35. Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 219.
36. Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
37. Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 79.
38. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 22.
39. Simon Critchley, *On Humour* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 219.